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Oct 3, 2004 · The idea of substance has its first theoretical articulation in Aristotle’s Categories, where he distinguishes between individual substances, such as a man or a horse, and the various kinds of properties they can possess, such as being five foot, white, lying down, or in the Lyceum (1b25–2a4).
- Form Vs. Matter
Since a substance is a compound of a substantial form and...
- Identity
The difference between the earlier version and the later one...
- Sortals
Substance sortals contrast with phase sortals; the latter...
- Categories
1. Category Systems 1.1 Aristotelian Realism. Philosophical...
- Leibniz on Causation
This passage can be read to mean that speaking of a...
- Temporal Parts
Haslanger (1994) discusses the connection between endurance...
- Form Vs. Matter
Substantial form always informs prime matter and in doing so it brings a new substance into existence; accidental form simply informs an already existing substance (an already existing composite of substantial form and prime matter), and in doing so it simply modifies some substance.
Sep 10, 2020 · “The subject of a surface or incidental change is a substance [its incidental form]. The subject of a substantial change cannot be a substance; if it were, the result would be a modification of that substance, that is, an incidental change. But we are trying to understand how a substance itself comes into being as the result of a change.
Within every physical substance, the substantial form determines what kind of thing the physical substance is by actualizing prime matter as individualized by the causes of that thing's coming to be.
Oct 8, 2000 · Man is a species, and so there is an essence of man; but pale man is not a species and so, even if there is such a thing as the essence of pale man, it is not, at any rate, a primary essence.
This is Aquinas’ famous doctrine of the unity of substantial forms: in one and the same thing it is one and the same substantial form that verifies of this thing all the essential predicates of the thing.
People also ask
Can a substantial change be a substance?
Is a substantial form a substance?
Can there be only one substantial form of a thing?
What is the nature of substantial form?
In substantial change, it functions as “matter from which” something comes to be (materia ex qua), whereas in accidental change, it functions as “matter in which” something comes to be (materia in qua). What these differences come to can best be seen from Aquinas’s own examples.
