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This chapter begins with a brief critique of foundationalist epistemology largely based on the claim that it is psychologically unrealistic. This serves to underline the fact that the book's treatment of the justificatory role of experience is not motivated by foundationalism.
Williams examines and rejects the idea that, unless our beliefs are answerable to a “given” element in experience, objective knowledge will be impossible. Groundless Belief was first published in 1977.
Dec 8, 2020 · Groundless Belief was first published in 1977. This second edition contains a new afterword in which Williams places his arguments in the context of some current discussions of coherentism versus the Myth of the Given and explains their relation to subsequent developments in his own epistemological views.
Inspired by the work of Wilfrid Sellars, Michael Williams launches an all-out attack on what he calls "phenomenalism," the idea that our knowledge of the world rests on a...
Classical phenomenalism is the theory that physical objects are logical constructions out of sense-data. In a more explicitly linguistic guise, it is the theory that the content of any statement about physical objects can be expressed by some complex statement about sense-data.
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Groundless Belief was first published in 1977. This second edition contains a new afterword in which Williams places his arguments in the context of some current discussions of coherentism versus the Myth of the Given and explains their relation to subsequent developments in his own epistemological views.
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Jul 26, 1999 · Groundless Belief was first published in 1977. This second edition contains a new afterword in which Williams places his arguments in the context of some current discussions of coherentism versus the Myth of the Given and explains their relation to subsequent developments in his own epistemological views.
