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- A non-causal account of the brain-mind correlations is to be preferred. We favor the theory of the identity of mind and brain, according to which states of phenomenal consciousness are identical with their neural correlates.
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6066586/Neural Correlates of Consciousness Meet the Theory of Identity
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Jan 12, 2000 · 1. Historical Antecedents. 2. The Nature of the Identity Theory. 3. Phenomenal Properties and Topic-Neutral Analyses. 4. Causal Role Theories. 5. Functionalism and Identity Theory.
Oct 26, 2023 · In the philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and psychology, the causal relationship between phenomenal consciousness, mentation, and brain states has always been a matter of debate. On the one hand, material monism posits consciousness and mind as pure brain epiphenomena.
Feb 5, 2015 · One of the major arguments against universal mind-brain identities is that the brains of creatures inhabiting worlds governed by different laws of nature would probably be very different from the brains that humans or animals actually have (Glymour 2007, p. 333; see also Lewis 1980, p. 216).
- Vera Hoffmann-Kolss
- vera.hoffmann-kolss@uni-koeln.de
- 2016
Oct 27, 2023 · In the philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and psychology, the causal relationship between phenomenal consciousness, mentation, and brain states has always been a matter of debate. On the one...
Jan 1, 1980 · By our current mind-brain theory, monism has to include subjective mental properties as causal realities. This is not the case with physicalism or materialism which are the understood antitheses of mentalism, and have traditionally excluded mental phenomena as causal constructs.
- R. W. Sperry
- 1981
Jul 27, 2023 · Furthermore, it substantiates the theory of mind-brain identity while shedding light on its neural foundation. Consciousness, viewed as an epiphenomenon in certain respects, simultaneously possesses causal potency.
3. The Causal Argument for Mind-Brain Identity Physicalists need not lose heart. There is another kind of argument which does establish physicalism. It simply points out that, as a matter of empirical fact, conscious states and physical states always seem to appear at the same place in
